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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
-irezlit court U. S., East. Dist. of Louisiania, November, 1854.
1n Admiralty.
THE STEAMERS MAGNOLIA. AND AUTOCRAT.
SHUTE vs. GOSLEE; GOSLEE vs. SHUTE.
1. Duties of steamers in the navigation of the Mississippi.
2. A steamer leaving the ordinary and usual track of vessels under the circum-
stances, is bound to show some palpable necessity for the deviation.
3. An ascending boat, running at great speed in a dark night, at a time when a de-
scending boat is visible, of whose course she is doubtful, takes the risk of a col-
lision: she ought to ease or stop her engines, till she is assured of the course of
the other.
4. A steamer is responsible for a collision which a better lookout than she had might
have prevented.
5. Where a collision is produced by the fault of one boat, she cannot complain that
the other had not used extraordinary measures of precaution before, or the clear-
est judgment in the selection of the method of extrication after, the collision be-
came imminent.
The facts of this case are fully stated in the opinion of the
Court, by
CAM.1PBE LL, J.-These are cross appeals from a decree of the
District Court, pronouncing a division of the damages sustained by
the respective parties in a case of collision.
In February, 1851, the steamboat Autocrat, (of the largest class,)
bound on a voyage up the Mississippi river, had a collision with
the steamboat Magnolia, (of the same class,) near Butlei's planta-
tion, in the parish of Iberville, and was sunk, occasioning the death
of several persons and the loss of the boat.
The libel charges that the Magnolia was seen rounding out from
Robertson's wood-yard, on the east bank of the river, and going
apparently square across. That the pilot of the Autocrat tapped
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her alarm bell, to signify her intention to go to the right, and pro-
ceeded towards the east bank; and then the Kagnolia tapped her
bell, signifying her intention also"to go towards the east bank, and
did so accordingly ;-thus the boats were brought into collision, by
this unskillful or reckless procedure. The Magnolia answers, that
she was rounding out from Robertson's wood-yard, on the starboard
wheel only, and had reached to near the middle of the river, and
was nearly stationary, her head pointing down, when the Autocrat,
-with a full head of steam and with great rapidity, "1 came upon
lier"-that the Autocrat left her usual and proper track without
any necessity, to come upon the proper track of the Magnolia, and
in disregard of the signal bell, which she rang upon the first per-
ception of this movement. This abandonment of the proper track
of the Autocrat, and this neglect of the signal bell, are pleaded as
the causes of the great calamity.
The officers of the respective boats who were on duty at the
time, have been examined, and to them -we are indebted for an
account of what took place. I conclude from that testimony, that
the collision took place a short distance above Butler's house, about
one hundred miles from New Orleans, and near the middle of the
river; that when the Magnolia left Robertson's Landing the Auto-
crat was crossing from the head of Bayou Goula bar to the western
bank of the river, with the view of prosecuting her voyage along that
bank, aiming to come close to it, near Butler's house, and was, when
first seen, nearly two miles from the Magnolia; that when the
Magnolia commenced her movement this purpose of the Autocrat
was discovered, and that her officers acted upon that conclusion,
and that the fact that the Magnolia was a descending boat, was
ascertained by those aboard of the Autocrat when she was a mile
distant; that the course of the Autocrat was about midway between
the west bank and the middle of the stream until the signal bell
referred to in the libel was rung, and that her velocity was fully ten
miles an hour. In reference to the signal bells, in comparing the
different accounts, my conclusion i that the bells were rung almost
simultaneously, the Autocrat ringing hers first, but that the signal
of the Magnolia was not rung as a reply, but that it was an anxious,
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convulsive movement, to warn the Autocrat of the imminent risk
and peril of the course she was taking, and to admonish her to de-
sist, rather than a response. I cannot understand the evidence of
the officers of the Magnolia to bear any other interpretation.
The pilot of the Autocrat furnishes the following explanation of
his conduct:-" They were pretty nearly a mile apart, when he
made up his mind she (Magnolia) was a descending boat, from the
way she was worked. It was then witness varied his course from
the line leading to X, (a point on the map near Butler's and near
the west bank,) and straightened the Autocrat up stream so as to
give the descending boat room to pass on the right shore. If wit-
ness had not varied his course under this impression, and with the
desire to give more room to the Magnolia, but had continued on to
the letter X, he thinks the collision would not have taken place, as the
Magnolia continued rounding out into the middle of the stream.
But if he had gone o letter X, and she had continued down the
river and kept the s. re, as I supposed she would do, we would most
inevitably have come together, and it was to avoid this that I
diverted from the course to the letter X."
We have here an explanation of the conditions in which the Auto-
crat was placed, the motives which they originated with her pilot,
and the conduct which resulted.
The testimony proves that the pilot misconceived the design of
those who nanaged the Magnolia. This is shown by his own state-
ment. He says, "up to the time he rang the signal bell he thought
the Magnolia was going into the right shore, but perceiving from her
bow that she was leaving the bend, or the west bank, I rang the
signal bell." He was also mistaken as to the mode in which the
Magnolia was managed, and her rate of speed-for he "judges that
both boats were running at the same rate of speed."
These misconceptions require me to examine into the condition of
the boat in reference to watches and assistance available to the
pilot. The captain of the Autocrat was not on duty. The mate
who supplied his place "was sitting behind the chimneys," and
was only aroused by the tapping of the bell of the Magnolia. He
then came forward, but so little did the pilot profit by his pre-
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sence, that he testifies the mate went below at this critidal moment.
There was a watchman in thq pilot-house, bht he seems to have said
nothing. The mate and watchman, however, testify they had ob-
served the Magnolia was moving on one wheel, afid. the engineer
had no doubt, from her moements, that. she waa a.demcending boat.
The quiry will arise, whether the Amtocrat .' which, does not
answer, her wheel readily," was suffmisudy-suf ed with officient
and uotive officers an men at this. time.. For, the present, we will
consider the facts. contained in the statement I have quoted from
this testimony. The course from which the pilot departed was.
certainly the correct one. He says, "the line witness has marked
on the map, terminating at X, he would have run if the river had
been entirely clear and he had no boats descending." That is the
usual course for ascending boats of the Autocrat's size at the then
stage of the water." The pilot, Paris, also of the Autocrat, says:
"In running the river at the atage of the water at the time of
ollision, witness has been in the habit of. holding a straight course
from the head of Bayou Goula bAr to the point above Butler's
house, falling in to the left shore, ascending, about Butler's house,
and this is the usual rauner of running the river at that point at
low stage of water."
These opinions are sustained, and the evidence of the practice
supported, by the mass of the pilots who have been examined. This
narrows the inquiry to an examiution of the causes for the devia-
tion in the circumstances of the particular cae. I.
The Magnolia had an equal right to pursue her voyage, and
was subject to the asane canditions as the Autocrat, to adopt the
ordiuary and reasonable precautions, which skill and experience had
aamrtamed, to avoid disasters. When her officers came to the deck
±o.arrange for their departure from Rbbertson's, they were to con-
sider .whether the necessary evolution of bringing her out and around,'
zould be performed without crossing the track of the Autocrat, and
.without awakening a well-grounded apprehension of such a peril.
TIhe Autocrat was within sight, and had indicated her character
.as an ascending vessel. It is a favorable circumstance in the case
.of .the Magnolia, that both her pilots were now on deck, and her
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movements were conducted at first under the observation of both,
and also, that the captain was at his place and attentive to his
duty.
No doubt seems to have been felt by either of these experienced
men, that they could bring their vessel to its proper place without
peril; and the result shows that she performed her circuit and was
in the middle of the stream when the collision occurred, and was
nearly abreast of the point X, on the west bank, to which the Auto-
crat had been directed.
In this connection the statements of the protest of the officers of
the Autocrat and of the witnesses, to the place .of collision, are im-
portant. There is, too, the confession of the pilot, that but for his
deviation there would have been no collision.
Was the movement of the Magnolia proper, and properly per-
formed ? It is a fact to be noticed, that neither in the protest, nor
in the libel, nor in the testimony of the pilot of the Autocrat, who
was on duty, is there any complaint of the departure of the.Mag-
nolia from the landing in the manner and at the time it was per-
formed. The attention of the pilot at the wheel was brought
directly to the point, and his answers are clear and exculpatory.
He says: "Witness would have done as the pilot of the Magnolia
did to get her head down stream, from leaving the wood-yard." He
describes the manceuvre he would have executed, corresponding to
that performed by the Magnolia. The pilot, Robb, of the Magno-
lia, says: "From what I saw of the collision, I believe the Magno-
lia was managed as well as she could have been. In descending the
river at that point, boats keep in the middle of the river ; the ascend-
ing boat, at that stage, crosses over into4the bend, just above Bayou
Goula, and runs the right shore for four or five miles. In saying
everything was done that was proper, by the Magnolia, to avoid the
collision, I say the engine was stopped ready to back, and the boat
was in her right place in the middle of the river, and on her right
course."'
The pilot, Duffey, examined for the libellants, says: "The pro-
per course for an ascending boat, at Butler's, and for a mile above,
is close in to the left shore, ascending; at Butler's, the descending
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boat should be about the third of the river from the Butler sh'ore,
with her head pointing about one hundred yards above Bayou Goula
bar." The'pilot, Sco#t, says: "1 The descending boat, about Robert-
son's wood-yard, ought to be in the Wddle of the river." Captain
Thomasson, of the Magnolia; says: 1 The- Magnolia was in about
the middle of the river at the time of the collision, if anything
slightly nearer the Butler shore, just in the position she would have
been, as a descending boat, if she had not made a stoppage, except
her head was pointing, &c. &c2' The weight of the testimony is,
that under ordinary circumstances, the middle of the river, is the
proper place for the descending boat at this place. But it some-
times happens that the descending boat, for business objects, or to
take the bend below, crosses to the western bank, and in the present
case a recollection of this influenced the pilot of the Autocrat. The
allegation of the libel is, that the Magnolia was apparenitly going
8quare across the river. The officers of the Magnolia disprove this
allegation. and say there *as no design to cross the river ; that she
moved with one engine, her larboard engine being at rest, and that
they came around as quickly as possible, "rounding all the time,"
and were ready to go ahead when the diverging movement of the
Autocrat was discovered, and then orders were given to stop the
engines, which were promptly obeyed. The evidence is not clear
as to the length of the circuit described by the Magnolia, nor as to
the space required for this evolution; but there is reason to conclude
that within two-thirds of the distance across the river it could be
performed with facility, and was so on this occasion. Without any
headway of consequence from the time the Autocrat took the alarm,
we find the Magnolia, at the time of the collision, in the middle of
the stream-her range to the west of that line could not have been
a wide one.
Before proceeding to the complaint presented in the libel, I will
notice the testimony of the pilots examined by the parties, aiid
especially those by the libellants, relative to the management of
boats and the customs of the river. -1 select the testimony of Capt.
Swan, with the view of collecting about it the mass of concurring
opinion that these depositions afford.
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1st. He says: "If a steamboat upon a descending trip were at
a wood-yard at night, and another boat should be coming up, and
8o near that a meeting would take place by the time the descending
boat could make her rounding, it would be imprudent for the de-
scending boat to start out or leave the shore.
2d. "That he has frequently rounded out when there was ar
ascending boat in sight below him, but not when such boat was very
near.
3d. "Thinks, if a boat was within a mile of him, of a dark night,
it would not be safe to round out.
4th. "If a boat were more than a mile below, there ought not to
be more danger from rounding out than from meeting a boat in a
-dark night.
5th. " If a descending boat was rounding oiti and had her hiad
down stream, and a collision were to occur between her and an
ascending boat, in a part of the river where the descending boat was
in her proper place, and the ascending boat out of hei proper place,
witness does not think the fact of collision would be evidence of ii-
prudence in the descending boat rounding out."
This testimony was given in the direct and cross-eiamination,
and applies to the case I have examined. . The witnisses genetally
lay down the first proposition as it is found in the foreging state-
ment.
The imprudence of leaving the 'shore is ascertained by the test,
"whether the boat would cross the line of the ascending boat's
course ;" and some of the witnesses used these words, (Allen and
Clements.) Duffey says, "she ought not to- leave unless she had
time to round out, get across the river, and straighten down under
headway, before meeting the ascending boat."
A number of the witnesses, looking to the facts that the river at
this place is wide, straight, and deep, with ample room for either
boat to move in her appropriate track, without interference, find no
reason for any restriction when a descending boat, under the cir-
cumstances, and say there is none in the daily management and
conduct of boats. Without declaring any judgment upon this, my
opinion is that the Magnolia did not fall under any of the restric-
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-tiops found in the :tatimony of this.witness, and thse who agree
with him.
Upon his rezmination, the same witness (Swan) says, "he
thinks it would be more proper in an ascending 4o., seeing a de-
scending boat leaving and rounding out from Robertson's, -to make
•fQr that shoe, aud for -the deseending boat to make for the .other
•slire, and thas a eollin would he avoided. Mis would be proper,
no matter what, under ordinary circumstances, was the proper rack
of au §$cending heat.
2d. "But, if he were dropping in:to the .left. Uask, aaeding, ond
he were to see a descending b1at rmiing.oz fAo. a teopposite
ba4k, ao s far round that hI bowm poitig own i -thpi ree-
tion of the ascending boat, but stlt rounding out, witAesWP boat
"b" g .erer-the left shore than the -right,%e " 4e proper
€oume fr tho .eonding :boatto avoid the cllisiou wwoq be 'to keep
-to-41 eitshore."
!4eeo opinions-are reeeived i6th meore hesitation by .tle -bdy of
piloto, and .the -wight of the opinion is, .that the :ascending boat
would hardly-be justified in leaving her approp te-shore, by the
single fu of seeinj a boat coni.g,out. Bwt if the 4scending
boat -were -to promptly -ass to the shore left by the otaer, before
tlze other came round, the chance of collision would -probably be
avoided.
With this -qualifcation, the opinion seems unobjectionable.
The Autocrat did not cross to the shore left by the Magnolia.
Her pilot, assuming that the Magnolia designed to cross the river
at a point above him, made a provision for that contingency, but
mado none for the more probable contingency of her descent in the
ordinary and usual manner..
On the eontrary, he took the measures -which brought about the
collision, when the contingency occurred. His testimony is, "the
reason he indicated his intention to go to the starboard was, that the
Magnolia was at the time closer to the right bank, descending, than the
Autocrat was, and he could not go to that shore without crossing
her bows. When the Magnolia gave her signal, he does not think
* she was more than from three to five hundred yards distant. The
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Magnolia, was coming round, when she rung her signal, and so con-
tinued until she struck the Autocrat. He did not know whether
she was on one wheel or two, but he knows she never stopped."
On his cross-examination he says: "Up to the time he rung the
signal bell, he thought the Magnolia was going in to the right shore,
(western,) but perceiving from her bow that she was leaving the bend
or the right bank, he rung his bell, &c."
At this time the Autocrat could not have been more than one-
third, or perhaps fourth, of the width of the river from the western
bank. The Magnolia was then rounding, and upon a single wheel,
with but little headway, and, upon the sight of the Autocrat's
movement, immediately suapended the action of her engine. The
course of the Autocrat was direct to the -opposite bank, and her
velocity was great, yet she encountered the Magnolia in the middle
of the stream. The Magnolia could not, within the time, hau
materially altered her position with respect to the opposite shores.
The testimony of the captain, mate, pilots, watchman, steward,
and one passenger of the Magnolia, is, that they saw the approach
of the Autocrat from the western bank. The pilot says : "When
the Magnolia had got nearly round, and when deponent, who was
at the wheel, had slacked her up, and was about to go ahead
with the larboard engine, he perceived the Autocrat leaving the
right bank, and coming towards the Magnolia. Deponent then,
instead of going ahead, on the bIrboard engine,.stopped the star-
board, and rang both bells to back. The Autocrat was then head.
ing towards the wood-pile we had left, and we were heading down
stream. It was not more than a minute after deponent rung the
engine bells to back, before the collision took place." The captain
says, "that seeing this movement of the Autocrat, he exclaimed to
the pilot to stop the engines and to back the boat, and that he rung
the signal bell, and that the second tap of his bell, and the single
tap of the bell of the Autocrat, were simultaneous."
The statements of these officers are sustained by the evidence of
witnesses on their respective boats.
I do not look for concordance in the statements of witnesses in
these cases. Discrepancies must arise, in consequence of the ex-
473
474 SHUTE va. GOSLEE; GOSLEE vs. SHUITE.
citement and alarm under which witnesses receive their. infpres-
sions. Especially must we look with hesitation upon all statements
in regard to time and distance, and in this case, the exact solution
of the questions of fact materially depend upon evidence in regard
to time -and distance. This. exhibition of. the evidence is sufficient
to enable me to declare the opinion I have formed upon the whole
case.
-I am forced to the conclusion .that an important cause which ope-
rated to produce this melancholy catastrophe, in which life and pro-
perty were sacrificed, is that the Autocrat had not on duty a com-
plement of efflcient and attentive officers and men at this time. The
character of the pilot is good,. his testimony in the case is clear and
frank, and, with competent aid, seems to have been adequate to the
duties of his place. For any practical purpose, he was the only
person in charge of the boat. The mate was where he could see
nothing-the watchman said nothing-the captain was asleep in his
room. -The pilot having thus a large boat, running with great speed,
not easy of management, commits a series of mistakes which have
led to fatal consequences. -When he ascertained the Magnolia was
a descending boat, he supposed she was moving ,quare across the
river, He did not discover that she'was moving only on a single
engine; and at the last, when she was a sluggish mass, nearly sta-
tionary, supposes she was running with the speed of the Autocrat.
I cannot but think that if he had obtained the information which
an intelligent and responsible officer, stationed in front of the vessei,
(10 Howard, 557,) would have given, this calamity might not have
taken place. In the important case of the Mellona, 5 Notes of
Cases, 450, the Judge of the Admiralty Court says: "With
respect to the second proposition, I worded it very carefully, I
asked the Masters whether, if there had been a good lookout,
there was a oossibility/that the collision might have been avoided;
and the answer was, that such a pos8ibility did exist; and I am of
opinion, in point of law, that if there had been previous negligence,
in not keeping a good lookout, then that party is responsible for all
the consequences which might by possibility have been prevented.
If, indeed, a party is to* blame, but by no possibility whatever
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could injurious -consequences have resulted from that culpability,
then the Court might not hold him responsible; but if a party
is to blame in the manner in which it is now satisfactorily estab-
lished this party was to blame, I hold that he is liable for the con-
sequences, which, bypossibility, he might have prevented." The
cases of the Iron Duke, 2 W. Rob. 378, and Europa, 2 Eng. ]L. and
Eq. 557, are to the same effect.
The Supreme Court of the United States, 12 Howard S. C. R.
443, employs, in the case of the Genesee Chief, a line of argument
and a force of expression which are applicable to the circumstances
of this, and the case of ,St. John vs..Paine, 10 Howard, 557, has an
important bearing upon it.
In the navigation of the Autocrat there were two capital errors,
which materially contributed to produce this disaster, and its fatal
consequences. This boat was run in a dark night, at great speed,
(some rating it as high as twelve and fourteen miles an hour,) at a
time when a descending -boat was visible, and the pilot at her wheel
doubtful of the course she was taking. This pilot, testifying under
the belief that the speed of the two boats was alike, says: "If
the Magnolia had stopped, the collision would not have taken
place." But the Magnolia was nearly stationary, and it was to the
excessive celerity of the Autocrat that we must charge this misad.
venture, which left no time for prudential calculations, or for mea-
sures of evasion or escape.
It is certainly true, that commerce has greatly profited from the
energy and daring that are displayed in the steam navigation of the
United States. But the convenience and profit of commercial men
must be held subordinate to the security of life and property, and
no prospect of commercial advantage can justify or. excuse those
who employ this great power in exposing incautiously to peril the
lives and property confided to them. Under the circumstances,
the pilot should have eased his engines or stopped his boat,
until he was assured there would be no collision; 8 W. Rob. 75;
2 W. Rob. 202. Nor was the Autocrat justified in attempting to
cross the river at the time her signal bell was rang. This ma-
nouvre was commenced when the circuitous movement of the Mag-
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nolia was apparent, and her direction to the middle of the 9tream
ascertained. -The pilot (who seems to have discovered this after the
engineer and watchman) then left the ordinary and usual track of
of iessels of this class, and in doing so, encountered a descending
boat at Ier'prop~r place in the river. There may be circumstances
which suspend the rules and usages of navigation, and mAke a rule
for the particular case; but the circumstances must be controlling.
A pilot cannot depart from a rule upon a surmise, conjecture, or a
speculation on probabilities. He assumes, in every case of a de-
parture, to show a palpable necessity. If this were not so, there
could be no confidence in navigation, no assurance to pilotage--
perils would be increased, and security correspondingly diminished.
The Fint, 6 Notes of Cases, 271 . the Gazelle, 5 Notes of Cases,
101 ; 1 W. Rob. 471.
The Magnolia, from the time her officers discovered the Autocrat
to be dan ascending boat, to the time the signal bells were rung, was
managed with reference to the fact that the Autocrat had a track
defined by the usages of the river navigation, which they were not
to encroach upon. That this was not done, is apparent from the
evidence already quoted.
In the circumstances attending the use of the signal bells, which
formed the gravamen of the complaint of the libellant, I can find
no ground for a decree against the Magnolia. It is probable
that the conduct of the officers at the time was injudicious; l ut
conceding that a responsive affirmative of the signal of the Auto-
crat would have been preferable, in the facts of this case, the
responsibility would not have been changed by this failure. The
circumstances of peril were then imminent, creating apprehension
and confusion of mind. The inquiry must be, whose fault was it
that such conditions existed ? A party who has involved himself
and others in peril, cannot be heard to complain of their want
of the clearest judgment in the selection of the modes of extri-
cation.
Upon a cartful examination of the testimony, I do not find the
charges of ignorance, recklessness, or neglect of the rules of river
navigation, made against the officers of the Magnolia, sustained.
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By remaining at the landing place, by the free use of signals and
other measures of strict caution, which are always praiseworthy,
the Magnolia might have avoided the catastrophe. She would thus,
by extraordinary care, have been secured against the faults I have
exposed in the management of the Autocrat. But- it would be un-
just to give a sentence of condemnation for her failure to provide for
remote and cgntingent dangers, arising from the errors of those who
require the indemnity.
The importance of this case, the sacrifices of life and property
which so often occur in cases of this description, have led me to
siftthe questions of law and fact, which arise upon the record,
and tiro expound at length the doctrine- of the Court applicable to
them.
A firm and impartial enforcement of these doetrinea will serve to
promote order and security in this vast department of the social
economy, and give stability to the interests embraced within it.
Decree of reversal; libel dismissed, with costs.
In the U. S. District Court for the .Eastern District of Louisiana,
in Admiralty.
R. L. MAITLAND & CO. vs. tHE BRIG ATLANTIC.
1. Where A, the master of a: brig, puts into a foreign port, by reason of a leak, and
there borrows money from B, and draws a bill of exchange upon C, which bill is
unpaid at maturity, and at the same time that the bill is drawn, he also executes a
mortgage or hypothecation,.in which there is a special stipulation that B is not
to take the usual marine risks in cases of bottomry and hypothecation, neither
instrument establishes a lien upon the brig, which can be enforced in the
Admiralty, for want of jurisdiction.
2. The essential difference between a bottomry bond and a simple loan'is, that on
the latter, the money is at the risk of the borrower, and must be paid at all
events; in the former, it is at the risk of the lender during the voyage, and the
right to demand payment depends on the safe arrival of the vessel.
3. Admiralty cannot enforce a claim for money which has been advanced on the
personal credit of the vessel owner or master, in a suit in rem.
4. Where a bill is drawn, and a bottomry bond taken for the same sum, the bill
must share the fate of the bond.
MAII & CO. vs. BRIG ATLANTIC.
The opinion of the Court, in which the facts sufficiently appear,
was delivered by...
MC(ALCOB, J.-The libel in this case alleges that prior to the 12th
of December,.1853, the Brig Atlantic, while- on a voyage from
Philadolphia to _ew Orleans, with a cargo of coal, spfung a leak,
ani wout into the pQrt of Key West for repairs, to enable her to
complete her voyage. That the master, Henry C. King, being a
ptranger in Key .West, and being in want of money to pay for
the necessary repairs, and having no other means of procuring
the same,. borrowed .of the commercial firm of H. H. Wall & Co.,
at Key West, the sum of eight hundred and thirteen dollars and
twenty-one cents, upon the hypothecation and mortgage of the
brig, her cargo an4 freight.
Ia. is .farther aUlgd that, in consideration .of said advance, the
iiaster kd~eW. 1~ .j4t or bill of exchange for the sum of eight
hundred and sixty.-t ,4ollars, which slm included the loan for
repairs, and six per cent. thereon for interest and commission. The
draft was drawn upon Henry Simpson & Co., of Philadelphia,
payable one day after sight; and in order to secure the payment
thereof, the master, by a certain ifiitrument of writng, dated 12th
December, 1853, and executed before a notary public at Key West,
hypothecated and mortgaged the brig, her cargo, freight, apparel
and furniture, unto the said Wall & Co. The draft was duly
assigned by Wall & Co. to the libellants, who, after due diligence,
not being able to find the drawees, caused it to be protested for
non-acceptance and non-payment, and gave notice thereof to the
drawer. This actbn is now instituted to hold the brig liable for
the payment of the amquntof the draft. Both the draft and instru-
ment of hypothecation and mortgage are annexed to the libel as
part thereof. The latter, after the usual terms of. hypothecation
and pledge, concludes with the following stipulation: "It is
expressly understood and agreed, that the said Wall & Co. do not
take upon themselves the marine risks usual in cases of bottomry
and ahypothecation."
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To the libel an exception had been filed by the claimants, to the
effect that this Court, as a Court of Admiralty, has no jurisdiction
to enforce the payment of the sum demanded.
It is evident that an extravagant rate of interest has been exacted
by the house of Wall & C., and it is this fact, coupled with the
stipulation in the instrument of hypothecation, to which reference
has just been made, which forms the basis of this exception.
Although the lender of the money seems to have intended to secure
the payment of the draft, by exacting both a mortgage on the ship,
and a pledge of the merchandise laden on board also, the instru-
ment cannot be properly regarded either as a bottdmry bond or as a
security in the nature of re8pond6ntia. That the master-had a
right, in. this instance, in a port of a state other than that of the
residence of the owner, to raise money for the payment of the
necessary repairs done upon the brig, by pledging the ship, cannot
be denied. And if the Court could regard the instrument before it
in the light of a bottomry bond, with the usual stipulations, it would
feel itelf compelled to exercise jurisdiction to grant the.party relief.
There would be a clear and well established lien upon the vessel,
which, according to the principles of the maritime law, could, be
enforced in'the Admiralty.
Contracts of bottomry are so called, because the bottom or keel
of the vessel is figuratively used to express the whole body thereof;
sometimes, also, but inaccurately, money lent in this manner is said
to run at respondentia-for that word properly applies to the loan
of moniey upon merchandise laden on board a ship, the repayment
whereof is made to depend upon the safe arrival of the merchandise
at the destined port. In like manner, the repayment of money
lent on bottomry does in general depend upon the prosperous
conclusion of the voyage; and as the lender sustains the hazard of
the voyage, he-receives, upon its happy termination, a greater price
or premium for his money than the rate of interest allowed by law
in ordinary cases. The premium paid on these occasions depends
wholly on the 'contract of the parties, and consequently varies
according to the nature of the adventure. Abbott on Shipping,
150, 151. The high rate of interest exacted by the lenders in this
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case, would, therefore, be sna valid objection to the libellants'
recovery, if it appeared from the act of hypotheuation-that.the usual
maritime risks had been "inourred;. but,, so far from this being the
ease, theoclause in the act of hypothecatioaT, to which reference has
been made, expressly, declares that no such risk was to be assumed.
The essential difference between abottomurybond and a simple loan
i*- that in the latter the money is at the. riskof the borrower, and
must be paid at all events; in the former; it is at the risk of the
lender during the voyage,- and the right to demand payment depends
on- the safe arrival of the vessel. And if the lender of money on a
bottomry or respondentia bond be willingi to stake the moneyi upon
the-saeatival of the ship or cargo, and to take urpon himself, like
an invoer, the risk of sea perils, it is lavful, reasonable and just,
that he should be authorized to demand andreceive an extraordinary
interest, to be agreed on, and whiclh the lender shall deem commen-
surate to the bwrd he-rtna. t a' 1ond executed as-an hypothe-
cation, but not upon the principles -- hich govern such securities, is
not a bottomry bond; capalble of being enforced in a Court of
Admiralty, but must be proceeded as at common IUW. It 'is abso-
lutely necessary that the liability.of the lader to the sew risks
should appear or be fairly collected from'the instrmnent; otherwise,
the- reservation of maritime interest will rendee the security void
on the ground of usury, not only as a charge upon the ship, but
also against the person of the borrower. And where an instrument,
called a bottomry bond, contained an express clause that the sum
secured should be paid within thirty days after intelligence of the
loss, Lord Stowell doubted his jurisdiction to entertain the suit at
all, and dismissed it, on the ground that the very essence of -bot-
tomry, which alone could-give jurisdiction to the Admiralty, was
wanting. From this sentence an appeal was prosecuted to the
Delegates, and that Court, after directing- a search -for precedents,
decided- that as the maritime interest was reserved, and maritime
risk was, excluded from the' bond; it wasw void. 1 Hagg. 55; 2
Hagg. 57.
It is contended by the proctor for the libellants, that the hypothe-
cation in this case, though bad in part, may by a Court of Admi-
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ralty be regarded as good in part, and as such, still be considered as
a legitimate contract for the exercise of its jurisdiction. If by
assuming this position, the proctor would maintain that the clause
in the hypothecation by which the libellants refused to assume
maritime risks, may be rejected by the Court, and the instrument
be enforced as a valid hypothecation independently of this clause,
he is widely mistaken. As the parties have chosen to bind them-
selves, so shall they be bound, and the Court has no authority
whatever to vary the stipulations of their contract simply for the
purpose of administering equitable relief, as a Court of Admiralty.
It is perfectly true that a bottomry bond may be bad in part and
good in part, and that as to the good, it is competent for a Court of
Admiralty to exercise jurisdiction to grant relief. But I apprehend
that this well recognized principle was never applied to a case like
the present. It has sometimes happened that advances have been
made for repairs in foreign ports, partly upon the personal credit
of the owners, and partly upon the credit or security of the ship ;
-and the whole amount of advances so made, has been included in
one bottomry bond. In such cases, it has been uniformly held that
as to the particular sum advanced on the personal credit of the
owners, the bond- was bad; but as to the sum advanced on the
security of tlie vessel, it was good, and that as to the latter amount,
a Court of Admiralty would exercise jurisdiction to enforce its pay-
ment. Such was the principle recognized by Lord Stowell in the
case of the Augusta, 1 Dodson, 287. "It is quite clear," said
the Court, "1 that the bill of exchange was founded on considerations-
of personal responsibility only, and that a bond of hypothecation
was not at that time in the contemplation either of the borrower or
lender. I have therefore no hesitation in saying that with respect
to the £600, the bond is not effective ; but with respect to the other
part of the money, I am of a different opinion. For it is evident
that no other security was held out than the ship and the freight,
and it is therefore so far indisputably, a bottomry transaction.
The foreign merchant, it is true, wished to extend the same species
of security to the whole of his debt, and I see nothing dishonest
or dishonorable in his attempt to do so; but, at the same time, this
31
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Court cannot lend its assistance by enforcing the bond beyond the
extent of. its legal validity. It cannot permit the party to say the
master had no other resource for procuring supplies except bottomry,
when he himself had been content to advance the money on the
personal responsibility of the owner. As far, then, as it relates to
the £600, I think, the bond is invalid; but for the rest, I think it
ought to be enforced. It is not necessary here, that a bond should
be either good or bad, in toto: In the equitable proceedings of this
Court, it may be good in part and bad in part." The case of the
Hero, 2 Dodson, and that of the .Hunter, Ware's Rep. 254, will be
found to correspond with the one just cited, and the decisions of the
courts are in strict conformity with the rules here laid down. It is
true that in the case of the Hunter, Judge Ware held that although
there.was a fatal objection to the instrument as, a bond securing
mprine interest, it was not perhaps quite certain that the creditor
could have no remedy upon it in a Court of Admiralty for the
principal sum advanced, with land interest. In that case, an
amendment to the libel was allowed, and upon a new allegation that
the libellant had a right to be paid upon general principles of the
maritime law, the amount which it was shown had been originally
advanced upon the personal credit of the owner, was decreed to be
paid with land interest only.
Without undertaking to question the correctness of the course
adopted by the learned Judge of the District Court of Maine, in
giving a remedy in rem for a sum which he previously declared had
been advanced upon the personal credit of the owners, it will be
sufficient to show that the case now under consideration differs
materially from that in which the amendment was allowed. In the
latter case, there was the usual assumption of maritime risks,
whereas the libellants here, as we have already seen, expressly
refused to take any such risks. The claim of the lenders should
-have been made to depend upon the safe arrival of the vessel. This
twas necessary to justify the Court in granting them now a remedy
in rem. It is perfectly true, as the proctor contends, that the very
tfact that advances had been made to defray the expenses of repairs,
'would create a lien upon the vessel, if such advances had been made
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upon the credit of the vessel, and that such a lien would exist; if
there were no special act of -hypothecation or mortgage. It would
indeed exist by operation of law. But if instead of relying upon
the general principles of the maritime law, the lender of the money
chooses to exact of the master a special hypothecation of the vessel
and cargo, and causes to be inserted in the instrument, clauses which
operate as a waiver of his lien, or as a forfeiture of his right to
proceed in rem, how can a Court of Admiralty grant him relief?
If, as in the case now under consideration, he exacts muritime
interest upon- his loan, and at the same time expressly refused to
assume maritime risks, is it not clear that the very instrument upon
which he relies for his security is, by the well recog ized principles
of the maritime law, an abandonment of all claim against the-vessel?
It is well settled that-if a material-man gives~personal credit, even
in the case of materials furnished to a foreign ship, he loses his lien,
so far as to exclude him from'- suit in rem. (4 Wash. 453.) This
rule is doubtless subject to the qualification that an ep~resa contract
for a stipulated sum is iot of itself a waiver of the' lien, unles& the
contract contains some stipulations inconsistent with the Continuanee
of the lien. (T Peters, 324.) The drawing of the bill bf exchange
does not, in my judgment, help the case of the libellsants. In the
case of the Augusta, already referred to, Lord Stoweal considered
that the taking of a bill of exchange by the holder of a bottomry
bond, was a strong circumstance to show that the advances were
made on the personal credit of the owners, and not on the credit of
the vessel, and he held the bond void for .the amount of the bill,
and good-for the advances made after the bill was drawn. It is,
however, the usual practice to draw bills of exchange; and there
is no inconsistency in taking this collateral security, nor has it ever
been held to exclude the bond, nor diminish its solidity. So it was
distinctly held.in the case'of the Jane. (. Dodson, 466.y But it
is well settled, that when a bill is drawn, and a bottomry borA
taken, with maritime interest, for the same sum, the bill must share
the, fate of the bond. Until the vessel arrives in safety at the end
of the voyage, the loan is at the risk of the lender, and if she is
lost, nothing is due upon the .bill more than upon the bond. When
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a bill is therefore drawn, and a bottomry bond given for the game
consideration, the owner is not bound to honor the bill; at least not
before the safe arrival of the vessel and the end of the risk.
For it does not appear that anything will ever be due until the
happening of the event on which the -bond becomes payable, and
then the payment of one security extinguishes both. (Ware's Rep.
252.)
It is further contended by the proctor of the libellants, th at it is
altogether premature, upon a trial of this exception to the jurisdic-
tion, to regard the interest charged by the lender as usurious; that
it is competent for the party upon the trial of the case upon its
merits, to show that under the charge of interest and commission,
there is ho usury; that the interest is one thing and the commis-
sion another, and that there is nothing to prevent the Court from
considering the one as separate and distinct from the other. When
the question of jurisdiction was first presented to the consideration
of the Court, I certainly did fot understand the proctor to deny
that maritime interest had been charged in the bill of exchange
and the instrument of hypothecation, and I cannot upon an
examination of that instrument, resist the conclusion that usury
lurks under this apparently harmless name of Commission.
The aggregate amount borrowed by the master was $813. This
was loaned at the rate of what is specifically denominated 6 per
cent. commission, and the advance and commission amount to $862.
For this, a draft is drawn, payable one day after sight, on the owner,
residing in the City of Philadelphia. Here, then, is the sum of $49
commission, charged upon a loan of $813 for the space of perhaps
ten days-allowing this time for the bill to be sent to the residence
of the owner, fromKey West. To use the expressive language of
Lord Stowell, in .the case of the 'Thatitudine, 3 Rob. Adm. R: 277,
"1I know that the word commission sounds sweet in a merchant's
ear; but-whether it is a proper charge or not on this occasion, I will
not take upon myself to determine without a reference to the regis-.
trar properly assisted." I entertain but little doubt that maritime
interest has been stipulated to be paid, and I have as little doubt
that it is fully within my power, sitting in a Court of Admiralty, to
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reduce the rate of interest, where it is manifestly exorbitant, that is
to say, in a case coming within my jurisdiction. The power pos-
sessed will, however, be exercised with great care and caution. The
Zodiac, 1 Hagg. 326.
But I do not pretend to assert the doctrine, that to justify this
Court, as a Court of Admiralty, to exercise jurisdiction over a
bottomry transaction, it is indispensably necessary that maritime
interest should be charged. This would, in my judgment, be alto-
gether unreasonable. The lender of money on a bottomry bond
certainly has a right to relinquish a portion of the profits he would
be entitled to realize; and the owner of a vessel would come with a
bad grace to contest the validity of a bottomry security, upon the
ground that the lender of the money had charged the master less
than he was authorized to exact under the maritime law.
Conceding then, that, in the case before us, maritime interest
was not demanded, and that the charges under the name of com-
missions will not amount to usury, can this Court, as a Court of
Admiralty, exercise jurisdiction of the case, when it is perfectly
apparent that no maritime risks were incurred ? I am clearly of
opinion that it cannot. In the language of Sir Stephen Lusington,
in the case of the Emancipation, 1 W. Rob. 128, "I must look to
the bond itself, without referring to extrinsic evidence at all; and,
unless I can come to the conclusion, from the words of the bond,
that any maritime risk is to be directly or indirectly inferred, I
must hold that I have no authority to pronounce in favor of its
validity." Again, that eminent civilian says, in the same opinion:
"I am perfectly satisfied that whatever might have been the inten-
tion of the contracting parties to the bond, both upon the face of
the bond itself, and according to legal inference, the payment of
the money advanced does not depend upon the safe arrival of the
ship. I must, therefore, pronounce against the bond."
Upon mature consideration, therefore, I am of opinion that, as
the pleadings now stand, I have no jurisdiction of the case, and
that the libel must be dismissed with costs.
GOCHENAUR'S ESTATE,
In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania--Fittsurg, 1854.
- GOCHENAUR'S ESTATE.'
1 The Orphans' Court $nd its auditors h.ave jurisdiction of the disputed claim of a
creditor against the estate of a decedent, whether the estate be solvent or insol-
vent.
2. Where the husband occupies the relation of trustee to his wife, and takes pos-
session-of her property in that capacity, such possession will not bar her right if
she survive him.
3. Reduction, by a husband, of his wife's personal property into his possession-so
as to change the ownership-is a question of intention to be inquired of upon all
the circumstances.
4. Conversion is not reduction, but only evidence of it.
5. Clear proof that the husband received his wife's money as a loan,- or a disclaimer
of intention to make it his own property, will preserve her right of survivor-
ship.
6. Alleged admissions to- that effect by the husband must be scanned with great
vigilance, to prevent the consequences of misapprehension.
7. Interest accruing during the husband's lifetime cannot be allowed, in fhe distri-
bution of his estate,upon a sum of money belonging to his wife, that was in his
hands, and which he might at any time have reduced into his own possession,
when there was nothing to indicate that he was willing- to pay interest for it. .
I.
This was an appeal from a decree of the Orphans' Court of Lan-
caster County, enterekd under the following circumstances:
Benjamin Gochenaur was appointed one of the administrators of
the estate of his wife's father, Christian Newswanger, on the 28th
day of M rch, 1846, and received at several times, as his wife's
share, sums of money amounting in all to $1786.
Gochenaur died on the 81st of December, 1851, and on the 19th
of February, 1853, the administrators of his estate filed their
account, showing a balance of $5186 55, "for distribution among
the heirs." To this account various exceptions were filed on behalf
of the widow, Barbara Gochenauw, the seventh and last of which
was in the following terms :-" The accountants have not paid the
widow of the said deceased her share or portioni -vihich, as adminis-
We are obliged to James E. Gowen, Esq., for the report of this case.
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trator of Christian Newswanger, deceased, he, Benjamin Gochenaur,
deceased, received, but which he never paid to the said widow,
amounting, principal and interest, to $2079 y-6u.4,
Upon motion of the attorney for the exceptant, the Court ap-
pointed D. G. Eshelman, Esq., auditor "to pass upon exceptions,
and make distribution among those thereto entitled."
Before the auditor the counsel for the widow claimed the amount
specified in the exception filed, upon the ground that the decedent,
Gochenaur, had never reduced the sum received by him as his wife's
share of the estate of Christian Newswanger, into possession, so as
to become his own property, and that consequently it was a debt
owing to her by the estate. The appellants, who were some of the
heirs -at law of Gochenaur, and distributees of his estate, alleged
that the sum claimed by the widow had been converted to his own
use by the husband.
The auditor having decided, upon the authority of a case in the
Orphans' Court of Lancaster County,' that he. had jurisdiction, and
having heard the testimony upon the question of conversion, sus-
tained the exception to the account, and awarded the widow the
several sums received by her husband from the estate of her father,
'Hrri 's EsTAn-.-That was a case in which, upofi a motion to have auditors
appointed to examine the exceptions filed to the administration account of the estate-
of Richard R. Heitler, Esq., deceased, and to distribute the balance, Judge Long
delivered the following opinion:
Previous to the Act of the 13th April, 1840, the law had been well settled by the
Supreme Court that an auditor had no authority'!o decide on the validity of a
claim, in a solvent estate, in the Orphans' Court. By that Act it is made the duty
of the Orphans' Court to appoint auditors for the purpose of distribution, " on the
application of any creditor, as they were before authorized to do, on the application
of the executor or adminitrator." And on the application of any legatee, heir, or
other person interested in the distribution of the estate of any decedent, the Court
is directed to "appoint one or more auditors to make distribution of such estate in
the hands of any executors or administrators, to and among the persons entitled to
the same." This Act, to a certain extent, has received a judicial construction in the
Supreme Courk, in the case of Kittera's Estate, 5 Harris, 417; and according to the
view taken by them in that case, of the provisions of the Act of Assembly referred to,
we are of opinion that the Orphans' Court have power to appoint auditors for the
purposes indicated in the motion:
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with interest calculated from a period immediately subsequent to
the receipt of the last sum.
Exceptions, in which the question of jurisdiction was raised, were
filed to the auditor's report, by the appellants, tjut the Orphans'
Court, (Long, President,) after deducting from the amount awarded
to the widow as a creditor of the estate, the interest computed during
the lifetime of the husband, dismissed the exceptions and confirmed
the report.
Upon the question of interest the opinion of the Orphans' Court
was in the following terms:
"But we think the auditor erred in allowing her interest on that
money during the lifetime of the testator. The money was received
by him to accomplish a certain object, viz: for the purpose of pay-
ing his debts, and the auditor thought, as soon as that object was
answered, he was liable for interest. When we take into considera-
tion that the testator had the absolute control of this money, and
might have converted it to his own use, we must not extend her
rights beyond, the agreement of the husband. Now, from the
whole testimony, there is nothing to indicate that he was willing
to pay interest for the money while, in his possession, but the con-
trary we think is indicated by the testimony. Besides, courts have
decided 'that where a wife permits a husband to receive the interest
or profits of her estate, without any agreement to reimburse, he will
not be required to respond to the wife for the same." cfc lensey's
Appeal, 14 S. & R. 64. The interest which, therefore," accrued in
the lifetime of the testator, and which is charged against his estate,
we direct to be struck out of the report, and with this modification
the same is confirmed."
The errors assigned in the Supreme Court were-
1. The Cburt erred in taking jurisdiction of the claim of Mrs.
Gochenaur. As an Orphans' Court, distributing a solvent estate,
they possessed no such power.
2. The Court erred in allowitkg the said claim, or any part.
thereof.
6. The Court erred in allowing interest upon that claim.
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The case was argued by
Messrs. N- .Ellmaker and J. E. Hiester,,for the appellants, who
contended-
As to the first assignment of error:
That the Orphans' Court has no jurisdiction; excepting that con-
ferred by. the Acts of Assembly creating it.
.Aetts' Appeal, 1 Whart. 7, decided that in* 1891 the Orphans'
Court had no jurisdiction of an adversary claim against the solvent
estate of a decedent. In Warner's Estate, 2 Whart. 295, the dis-
tinction between solvent and insolvent e~tates was stricken iway,
and the jurisdiction denied in either case.
Was jurisdiction conferred by the Act of 1832, or its supple-
ments ?.
The 4th section of the Act of 1832, extends the jurisdiction,
inter alia, to the distribution of the assets of decedents, after the
settlement of administration accounts, among creditors and others
interested; and the 19th section provides for the appointment of
auditors, upon the application of the executor or administra-teri to
make distribution among creditors, whenever there shall-not be suf-
ficient assets to pay all debts.
The first clause of the 1st section of the Act of 1840, authorizes
a creditor -to apply for the appointment of additors in tt~e same
cases that an executor or administrator could by the 19th section of
the Act of 1832.. The second clause of the same section directs
the Court, upon the application of any legatee, or other person
interested in the distribution, to appoint auditors to make distri-
bution among those entitled. The first clause authorizes, by
express words, the interference of creditors in inisolw.t estates
only, as under the 19th section of the Act of 1832. The second
clause might, perhaps, be tortured to include creditors by inference.
But can jurisdiction be acquired by inference? But is there a fair
inference to that effebt ? The use of the word creditors in the first
clause, and its omission imthe secoud, shows an intent not to include
creditors in the latter. If such were not the case, the first clause
is superfluous. The object of the second clause was to provide for
the distribution of solvent estates among the' distributees, after the
payment of debts, a matter omitted in prior acts. Kittera's Eistate,
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5 Harris, 416, does not conflict with this view. There the estate was
largely insolvent. The judge who delivered the opinion of the'
Court, construed the acts, as strongly as possible, in favor of the
right of creditors to interfere in, all estates, but the distinction be-
tween solvent and insolvent estates did not arise. The Orphans'
Court has no jurisdiction of a disputed claim against a solvent
estate. Latimer's Estate, 2 Ash. 520.
As to the second assignment:
It is olearl from the testimony, that Gochenaur had converted
the money received from' Newswanger's estate to his own use, with-
out any agreement with his wife'or any one that she should be
repaid. His estate was increased by it, of which she reaps the'
benefit, as his widow. Loose declarations "on his part, or a mere
intention to give, create no liability. When he afterwards had the
means to repay her, he never recognized her right to require it.
Phr's Guardian vs. -usband, S. C., May, 1848, (not reported';)
ffoiael -. HoZsel, I Wh. .Dig. 925, pl. 531; 0levenstine's Appeal,
3 Harris, 496, and 5 Vesey, Jr., 71, were recited.
At -to the third assignment:
Interest was never thought of by Gochenaur and his wife; and
it is well settled that where interest is not part of the contract, it is
not demandable until a demand be made, which was not done in
this case until the exception to the account was filed in 1853.
A. Herr Smith, Esq., for the appellee,
As to the first assignment of error, cited Act of April 13, 1840,
Sec. 1, Bright. Pun. p. 211, the opinion of Lewis, J., in Kittera's
Estate, 5 Harris, p. 422 ; and ihe opinion of Black, C. J., in White-
side vs. Wliteside, 8 Harris, 474.
As to the second assignment of error:
The question was one of law and fact. As to the facts, the audi-
tor was correct in his finding. His opinion of' the law was equally
correct, and is supported by the authorities cited by him and by the
cases of Baker vs. Hall, 12 Yes. 497, and Gray's Estate, 1 Barri
329.
As to the third assignment:
Interest was allowed from the death of the husband. If the
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appellee is entitled to the principal, it was a debt payable at the
'death of the msband, and.minst bear interest.
The-'opinion of th Court was delivered by
W00DWARD, J.-Undr the terms of the Acts of Assemblyxq-
lating to the jurisdiction and powers of tp Orphans' 10ourts, aUd
the opinion of this Court in Kittera's tate, 5 Harris, 422, ie'is not
to be doubted that the Orphans' Court of Lancaster hajrisdiction
of the widow's claim in this case. The second and-more impotsnt
question is, whether, under the circumstances in proof before the
auditor, the money claimed was so reduced. into posasesRon by '
hisband as to become his property. If it was, the widowh s no
title to it; if it was not, her right survived, and may bq asserted-in
the.Orphans' Court. T e money came into ,his hands as admni
trator of ,Christfia lowswanger, of. whoe Barham was,,a daugher
?ad heir.; and to her Gojohenajir 4tpbaiu 4he, 4o"b reUtiogkqf
husband and trustee.. . , . .
In Baker vs. Hall, 12 Vesey, 497, whore w exe. or entered
-ngo possession of the real and personal estates of the testator, par-
ried one of the 'residuary devisees under the will, and died leaving
er surviving him, it was held by Sir William Grant, Mastar of the
Rolls, that the husband must be considered to have entered into
possession as trustee and executor of the will only, ud not ashus-'
band; and therefore his wife's share of t e residue could not be
deemed sufficiently reduced into possession, so. as to prevent its sur-
viving to her upon his decease. And in WaU vs. Tq 74an, 16
Vesey, 413, it was said that the transfer of stock to a husband,
merely as trustee, cannot be regarded as a reduction into possesion
that will entitle his representatives. It was made di'erso.iItuit.t
If the husband takes possessiop,,says Ch.;Kent, 2d CoW 138, in
the character of trustee, and not of husband, it is not. such a pos-
session as will bar the right of the wife if she survive him. The
property must come under the actual control and possession of the
husband, quasi husband, or the wife will take as survivor instead of.
the personal representative of the husband.
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This distinction has been fully adopted in Pensylvania, arid a
series of well considered cases, carrying out the principle ta its
logical result, has established that- reduction into possession, so as
to work a change of ownership, is a question of intention, to be in-
quired of upon all the circumstances. Conversion is not reduction
into possession, but only evidencer-of it; and therefore conversion
may be explained by other evidence, negativing the intention to
reduce to possession in suchmanner as to transfer the title. Ac-
cording to these cases, marriage is treated as only a conditional
gift of the wife's "choses iii action--or, to speak more accurately, a
gift to theihusband of her power to dispose of them to himself, or
any one else, by force of the dominion to which he has succeeded as
the representative of her person ;-and because the gift is condi-
tional, he has a right to reject it by refusing to perform the con-
dition. The law does not cast it from him beyond his power of
resistance, for every gift requires the assent of the donee, and hence
clear proof that a husband received his wife's money as a loan, or
a disclaimer of intention to make it his own property, proved by his
admissions, will preserve her right of survivorship. Siter'8 case, 4
Rawle, 478 ; iless' Appeal, 1 Watts, 255 ; Hinds' -Estate, 5 Whart.
138; Timbers vs. Katz, 6 W. & S. 290; Gray's' Estate, 1 Barr,
829; Toelper's Appeal, 2 Barr, 71.
It is said in Gray's case, that such admissions as a medium of
proof are to be scanned with extreme vigilance; and to preveht the
consequences of misapprehension or mistake on the part of -wit-
nesses, it is necessary that they be deliberate, precise, clear, and con-
sistent with bach other; not inconsiderate, vague, or discrepant ;-a
rule founded in the experienced uncertainties of parol proof, and
most necessary to be continually applied. Beside the implications
from the fiduciary character of Gochenaur, we have in this case his
declarations and admissions, made, not in casual conversations after
receipt and conversion of the money, but in the very act of receiving
it, and which seem to answer all the conditions of the above rule.,
Thus Barr, who saw him receive $4i5 of the money in 1850, swears
that he declared at the time, "it is my wife, Barbara's, and it is to
be her's." And Ann Newswanger, speaking of the money he got
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from the notes and articles bought at the vendue, amountiag to
8700, reports him as saying "he would take this money and pay
his debts on which he was paying interest,'but that it was Brbara's
money and should be her's." Anna Kline thinks she was present
three times when Goclienaur got money, and every time she heard
him say it was his wife's and should be her's. 'She saw him count
the $700; he said "it was his wife, Barbara's--he owed it and was
going to pay it out--he ought'nt almost to take it to pay his debts."
It cannot be doubted that such declarAtions imported an intention
to convert the money to his own use as his wife's money and not his
own ;--that is, they explain the act of conversion consistently with
his intention that it should survive to her, and not be so reduced into
his possession as to extinguish her right.
The 'credibility of the witnesses was for the auditor, and we can-
not rejudge his judgment on this point. Taking their testimony
as true, we think the auditor and the Court were right, in view.of it
and of the fiduciary-relation of Gochenaur to the fund, in debreping
the, money.to Barbara. The Court were clearly right in reversing
the auditor on the question of interest, and of this the appellant
has no reason to complain.
The decree is affirmed.
Louisville Chancery Court, entuc4c/-May 11 , 1855.
VANDERPOOL VS. THE STEAMBOAT CRYSTAL PALACE.
1. Responsibility of owners of steamboats for thefts committed on them.
2. The boat will be liable, when it is furnished with state rooms and locks to, the
doors, if a watch, breastpin, pocket money, and such like, should be stolen from
the room in the night-time, without breaking. This is the general rule. There
are exceptions.
3. Where such is the structure of the berth, the officers of the boat must know
whether the looks are in order or not; and if not, they must look to the protection
of such property of the passenger, as before mentioned. It is not the duty of
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the passenger, in such case, as a general rule, to take such articles to the clerk,
or other officer, for safe keeping. They are part of his personal apparel, and
the inconvenience would be too great.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Pn#TLE, Chancellor.-The complainant was a passenger on the
steamboat Crystal Palace from Paducah to Louisville, and on the
night of her arrival at Louisville, a thief entered the state room
where he was sleeping and atole from him his gold watch and chain,
a diamond breastpin and a sum of money; and to make the boat
liable for his loss, this attachment was sued out of chancery.
The boat was constructed in the modern style, with separate
rooms for passengers, and locks to the doors. It is proved that the
lock to the door of the -room in which the plaintiff slept was in some
way out of. order, so that it would not fasten. This had been found
out by him the night before the felony, and it was mentioned by
the plaintiff- and his brother, who staid in the same room with him,
to the waitersmabout the cabin; and when one was called as the
plaintiff was about to retire, to see if the door could not be secured
in some way, he said there was no -ay of fastening it but by put-
ting a chair or baggage against it, which was done.
The common lawdoes not Ii a rule directly applicable to just
such a case as this. When it was formed there were no steamboats,
and ihe *orld had seen no such internal navigation as bears our ten
hundreds of thousands of people in crystal palaces on our majestic
rivers. But all civilization has held public carriers by water to a
responsibility more or less strict, according to the necessity demand-
ing it. By the Roman law, (which is still the rule over the larger
part of the Christian world,) ship masters, as well as innkeepers and
stable keepers, were put under a peculiar responsibility, and made
liable for all losses not arising from inevitable casualty or over-
whelming force. The common law went further as to the ship
master, who was a common carrier, and made him liable for every
loss, unless it was by the act of God or the enemies of the King.
But these rules, both of the civil and the common law, applied only
to the property of the passenger or traveler which was put into the
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custody of the ship ma§ter, &c. They did. not apply to such articlep
as the passenger kept about his person$ or in his own charge. The
rule at inns was different where the goods were stolen. from the
apartments assigned to the guest,
By one of the most enlightened codes that. any v nization has
.seen, (although compiled in 1263,) it was provid4 1 that ever7thing
which travelers, either by sea or land, put into inns,", taverns, or
ships that navigate the sea or rivers, to the knowledge of the owners
thereof, or of those who act in their places, shall be taken care of;
so that mo loss or damage happen to them: and if they get lost
through their neglect, or fraud, or fault;. orif they be stolen by any
persons who come with the travelers, then such owners, shall be
bound to pay for everything that is lost or damagod; for it is but
just tha 'since travelers confide to them their person - and e5ects,
they should honestly and faithfully take care of. theT, so that they
sustain neither loss nor damage. And what we-say in" i & is
understood of hotel and innkeepers, and of ownwaof ysejwsho
are in the habit of publicly receiving, persons for hire or. for ,.
price." 2 Moreau d- Carleton's 1artidas, Partida 5,. tit. 8, L 26.
This looks very much as though it would include a loss of property
in the charge of the person of the traveler, as well as that, handed
over to the care of the master of the vessel, or of the innkeeper; in-
deed, it seems to put the master of the vessel under the same respon-
sibility laid on the-innkeeper. This law originated with a country
then much more commercial (Spain had splendid ships at that'tim.)
.and much better enlightened, than that from which the common law
has-come was at the same date.
The liability of ship masters, innkeepers, &c., under these diffr-
ent codes, always had reference to necessity of intercourse, the pro-
tection an~d accommodation openly offered the traveler, and the
danger there was of the acts of the parties, of servants .d othera
employed by the cairiers, or innkeepers, &a., or of strangers who
might combine with them. In this country, where we have a neces-
sity of intercourse, a traveling beyond anything seen in any other
age, or now in any other country, we have also a better accommo-
dation and protection offered by steamboats than are to be found in
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any other part of the world. The law of bailments" involved in
these things, must advance with them. The law of the cara-
vels in former times about the coasts of thq old world, or of such
open.ships as Columbus procured to find another 'hemisphere, must
have been different, when they had been engaged in the unsublime
pursuit of carrying passengers for hire, from that of the splendid
palaces that float so invitingly on the American rivers. Here is the
parlor, and here is the secure state room offered, with its door to be
shut and looked with its inside key.
I can recollect -when the passenger steamboat was first built on
our rivers. It had no door then to protect the berths or sleeping
places. They had only the benefit of drapery, except rooms for
ladies. Then, of course, the passenger could not expect, when he
stepped in haste on this fast traveler, that he could sleep secure
from thieves, if any were about, with his watch and breastpin and
money near him; and the boat should not then have been liable for
what was not specially put in the care of its officers, any more than
for a picking of a pocket by q stranger on one of its decks; no
more than an iinkeeper should be liable for such an act in the
public entrance hall. But when the. steamboat is so furnished as to
offer the passenger the protection of lock and key, he has a right
to expect it, and go on board, as he often does in this country, with
a haste that would not allow him to inquire whether all is in fit
order or not; and in such instances, if he takes his watch and
breastpin, and such like articles to his room, or a reasonable sum of
money, when he goes to bed, and they are stolen, the boat should
be held liable. I would not hold -the owner of the boat as an inn-
keeper is liable at the common law for an interior breaking and
robbery, but only as, I think, the civil law would have held him, in
analogy to its law of innkeepers, for a failure to carry the party
and his effects under his charge, or about his person, with the care-
fulness substantially offered to every traveler from the structure of
the boat.
But it may be contended that if the passenger finds out that the
lock of his door is out of order, he should undergo the risk, or take
such articles of value as have been about his person to some officer
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of the boat for better care. I do not think so, as a general rule.
The boat's owner has engaged his safety; and if a lock is out of
order, the officers of the boat ought to know it, and have it put in
order; or take other means, such as setting a watch or guard, or at
any rate ofier to take charge and care themselves of the property
exposed. Circumstanices might change the course to be taken, but
none are shown here. It seems to me that unless such a rule be
established, passengers will be subjected to the depredations of ser-
vants, or others, who may withdraw keys, seeking the chance of
carelessness, or too much confidence on the part of the traveler.
It is proved by one witness that there was a plrinted card posted
up in the state rooms requesting passengers to lock their doors, and
place ny valuables which they might have, in the hands of the
clerk for safe keeping, otherwise the boat would not be responsible
for such articles. It is not shown, however, that the plaintiff had
seen the notice, if there was one in his room. But it could not be
supposed that this notice meant that every passenger should deliver
his watch, breistpin and pocket money every night to the clerk;
for it would be an inconvenience unheard of: these are a part of
his apparel, and he might be subjected to disputes about their iden-
tity every morning; but it had reference to "valuables," not to be
kept with the door locked-noihing ordinarily belonging to his
dress, or 'carried about his person. The notice, I think, did not
excuse the boat from the loss which happened, because the door
could not be fastened. The engagement implied was to have the
lock in order, or stand responsible for the robbery. Another rule
would be unsafe to the great traveling public in this country. I do
not say this implication exists in all instances where the berths are
finished with doorsto be locked; but I do not think the rule quali-
fied by anything in this case. Wherefore it is decreed that the
defendants pay the plaintiff $560, and the costs of this suit; and
unless they shall do so in fifteen days, the Court will make such
order against the surety as may be proper to enforce the same.
Bullitt ~. Smith, for plaintiff. Barret J- Wood, for defendant
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ISHAM vs. GREENHAM.
Superior Court of Cincinnati.
AUGUSTUS ISRA.M VS. THOMAS GREENHAM. 1
1. A common carrier, or other bailee for the transportation of property, must permit
the consignee, if he requests it, to examine the cargo at the place of deliTery,
before he can demand his freight.
2 The duties of the carrier, and consignee, are correlative : the one to deliver, and
the other to pay the freight; both are mutual acts.
8. Where the carrier demands a larger sum than that which is stipulated by con-
tract, and refuses to deliver the property at the place of its destination until
such additional sum is paid, he may be sued in tort for the conversion.
4. Where the carrier refuses to receive any sum less than the whole amount he'thus
claims, and the consignee offers to pay the sum stipulated in the contract, no for-
mal tender of that sum is required from the consignee: the law in such a ease
will not aik- him to do aevain thing.
OrA the trial, the plaintiff proved that his correspondent in Toledo,
Olio, in September last, shipped on the canal boat St. Mary's, of
which the defendant was master, thirty tons of ice, to be carried to
.0incinnati, and delivered to plaintiff without delay; the stipulated
freight being eighty dollars, and the canal tolls in addition. The
defendant signed a bill of lading, embodying the contract as
proved.
On the arrival of the boat at Cincinnati, the plaintiff called upon
the defendant and expressed his readiness to receive the ice, stating
at the. same time, as the weather was very hot, it was necessary to
lanc the. cargo, and place it immediately under cover,. the ice-hous6
-&the plaintiff being but a short distance from the place of land-
iig,.and- preparations were immediately made for that. purpose.
to: thin application the defendant returned for answer, that he
would ,nu permit the ice to leave the boat, until not only the sum
agree& upon for freight and tolls was first paid, but twenty-five dollars.
in ad cl ion, for a claim which he asserted for damages said to have
We are indebted to the Messrs. Handy for this case, which wil be found in
Handy's Rep., v. 1, p. 357.
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been sustained somewhere upon the passage from Toledo, by the
detention of the boat. This additional sum the plaintiff refused to
pay, but proffered to pay the amount stated in the bill of lading;
this was in return refused by the defendant, who declining to deli-
ver the cargo, except upon the terms he prescribed, the plaintiff
commenced this action and obtained an order for the delivery of
the ice.
The case was submitted to .the Court by the consent of the
parties, and after a full hearing, judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STORER, J.-The defendant asks for a new trial, on the ground
that his len for freight gave the right to retain the property until
the amount was paid, or tendered, by the plaintiff; and though
there was an offer to pay the freight, there was no exhibition of
the money to the defendant at the time the offer was made, and
the defendant, therefore, might well refuse to deliver, until he was
satisfied of the plaintiff's ability to pay, should the tender have
been accepted.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, insists that the defendant had
no lien but for the freight agreed to be paid, and the assertion of a
lien beyond'that sum was an ulawful assumption of authority over
the property, which, when coupled with the refusal to deliver,
except upon his own terms, was equivalent to a conversion in law;
that the defendant having placed himself in this position, waived
a formal tender of the real amount due, and could not require it to
be made.
It is very clear, that unless there is a stipulation for the payment
of freight at some other place, and at some other time, .than the
point of delivery, ihe carrier has a lien upon the cargo for his
freight, and cannot be compelled to release it, except by the pay-
ment or tender of the amount.
The stipulation in the bill of lading, that the property shall be
delivered to a consignee, on the payment of freight, creates a cor-
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relative duty on the part of the carrier and the consignee, -the one
to deliver, the other to pay. Neither are compelled to perform
their part of the agreement, unless both are willing and ready to
act in good faith. As the obligation to perform is mutual, neither
can avoid the duty imposed-upon each, and claim at the same time
the protection of the law. There can be no advantage gained by
retaining the cargo on board the vessel, or refusing to break bulk
that the condition of the cargo may be known, for the consignee
is clearly entitled to examine it, and ascertain whether it is in such
order as he will accept it or not; and where the carrier obstinately
refuses to land the cargo, or to store it, still retaining his lien for
the freight, he ought not to expect that his conduct will be re-
garded with a favorable eye, should the question be subsequently
litigated.
"Where there are mutual acts to be performed by contracting
parties at the same time, neither party is bound to do the first
aet, but each is bound to perform his own; and he who is able and
ready, has a-right of action against him who is not." rammond
vs. GiTman, 14 Conn. 479. In Tate vs. Meek, 8 Taunton, 280,
Chief Justice Gibbs decides the precise point. See also, Yates vs.
Baiston, 8 Taunton, 302, and Ohristie vs. Lewis, 2 B. & Beattie,
4110.
Without disputing the carrier's -lien in the present case for his
whole freight, it cannot be claimed that he could assert it for any
,other amount than that stated in the bill of lading.
'There can be no lien for unliquidated damages, nor for any breach
-6f covenant to furnish a full cargo, nor for demurrage, nor for pilot-
-ge or port charges. As the contract of affreightment is the only
basis of the lien, it is never extended to embrace any other claim
than that stipulated to be paid for the carriage of the goods; all
4'lse must be matter of special agreement.
In Bailey vs. Gladstone, 8 M. & S. 205, the Court of King's
-Benh held, that the "owner could 'not detain the goods for dead
freight or demurrage," and a bill being afterwards filed in equity,
to set up the lien, Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls, dis-
-niissed it. Gladstone 's. Bailey, 2 Merrivale 401 ; see also,
ISHAM vs. GREENHAM.
Philips vs. Rodie, 15 East, 547 ; Jones vs. Tarleton, 9 Mees. &
Wells. 657.
If there was no lien, that the defendant could set up for his
damages, what was the effect of including such a claim in his demand
for freight, and refusing to deliver the cargo until the whole amount
was paid?
On general principles, whenever the act of one party, to whom
another is bound to tender money, services, or goods, indicates
clearly that the tender, if made, would not be accepted, the other
party is excused from the technical performance of his agreement.
The law never requires a vain thing to be done.
So when the creditor declared he would not receive the money, if
tendered, it was held. that the debtor need not make the tender;
2 Wash. C. C. R. 143. And in that large class of cases where the
vendor contracts to deliver a chattel at a given time and place, and
the conduct of the vendee is evasive and inconsistent, implying bad
faith, it will be for the Court to decide, sitting as they did in this
case, as a jury, whether a formal tender should be required or not.
It ought not to be required that a strict rule should be applied to
one party, where the other had shown himself not only careless of
his obligation, but had rendered a strict compliance unnecessary.
Gilmore vs. Holt, 4 Pick. 258; Borden vs. Borden, 5 Mass. 74.
It would have been useless, then, for the plaintiff to have tendered
the amouni due as freight, when he had already been told it would
not be accepted. The claim asserted by the defendant was illegal,
and having refused to deliver the cargo, unless that claim was
paid, the plaintiff had nothing to do but to regard the carrier's acts
as unlawful, and hold him responsible for the value of the property
in tort.
In Blair vs. Jeffries, Dud. S. C. R. 59, it is held that if the car-
rier refuses to deliver the goods for any other cause than the non-
payment of freight, he cannot avail himself of the want of a tender
of the freight. See also, Angell on Carriers, § 346.
This ruling is the result to which the analogous cases conduct us.
Where one party, having a just claim, destroys it by adding that
for which there is no authority in law, and no agreement of his co-
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contractors; and when'the effect is to assume a contiol over pro-
perty not authorized by the relation of creditor and debtor under
the agreement, it is a direct appropriation, to the use of the carrier,
and he must answer for his unauthorized act to the owner of the
goods. The remedy may be trover or replevin, at his option, as the
evidence will sustain either form of action.
This view of the case disposes of the points taken by the de-
fendant's counsel, as to the necessity of an actual tender, and
te many cases quoted in the argument, can have no application
to the case.
We hold, under the circumstances, that no tender was necessary;
and if there had been, it was waived, and rendered unnecessary by
the conduct of the defendant.
The motion for a new trial must be overruled.
A. S. Sullivan, for plaintiff. Todd, for defendant.
RECENT ENGLISH DECISION.
GURNEY AND OTHERS VS. WOMERSLEY AND OTHERS.'
1. The vendor of a bill of exchange, though not a party to the bill, is responsible
for the genuineness of the instrument; and if the name of one of the parties is
'a forgery, and the bill becomes valueless, the vendee is entitled to recover the
price.
2. The defendants, who were bill brokers, having received from A: a bill of ex-
change drawn and endorsed by him, for the purpose of being discounted took it
to the plaintiffs, who were money lenders, with whom the defendants had previ-
ously had dealings: they declined to endorse or guarantee it, and the plaintiffs,
upon the credit of the acceptance, discounted it. There were separate notes be-
tween A. and the defendants, and the defendants-and the plaintiffs; and the rate
of discount charged by the defendants to A. was higher than that charged by the
plaintiffs to the defendants. The acceptance was forged by A., and the bill was
valueless. Eied, that the defendants having been found by the jury to have dealt
with the bill as principals, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the sum paid
to the defendants upon the discount of the bill
' 19 Jurist 328. Court of Queen's Bench.
GURNEY AND OTHERS vs. WOMERSLEY AND OTHERS.
NYov. 4,1854.-Action for money had and received. Plea, never
indebted. On the trial, before Lord Campbell, C. J., at the Sittings
at Guildhall after Trinity Term, 1854, it appeared that the plain-
tiffs, who were money lenders, and the defendants, who were bill
brokers or discount agents, had extensive dealings together, in the
course of which the plaintiffs had frequently discounted bills for the
defendants, which were drawn and endorsed in the name of Ander-
son. Some of these bills the defendants endorsed or guaranteed,
and others were discounted without such endorsement or guaranty.
On the occasion of one of the bills, endorsed by Anderson, which
was for £3000, and purported to be accepted by Van Notten & Co.,
being brought to the plaintiffs for discount, the defendants were
asked by the plaintiffs to endorse or guarantee it, but they declined,
and the -plaintiffs discounted it, without such endorsement or gua-
ranty, upon the faith of the acceptance of Van Notten & Co. This
acceptance turned out to have been forged by Anderson, who be-
came bankrupt, and was subsequently convicted of the offence.
The only genuine name upon the bill was that of Anderson, and the
bill proved worthless. The mode of dealing was, that separate
notes passed between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and between
the defendants and Anderson, and a different rate of. discount was
charged, the plaintiffs charging the defendants £5 per cent., and
the defendants charging Anderson £6 per cent. for discount, and
10s. per cent. agency commission. The Lord Chief Justice left to
the jury the question whether the defendants had dealt with the
bill as principals, or only as agents for Anderson, and directed
them that in the former case the defendants were liable to refund
the amount received on the discount of the bill, as upon a failure of
consideration. The jury found a verdict for. the plaintiffs for £3000.
In the following Michaelmas Term, (Nov. 4),
Bramwell moved for a rule nisi for a new trial, on the grounds
of misdirection and of the verdict being against the evidence.
COLERIDGE, J.-I am of opinion that there should be no rule on
either ground.
As to the verdict being against the evidence, the distinction
pointed out between the dealings with the -bills endorsed or guaran-
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teed by the defendants and those which they did not endorse, or
guarantee, has reference to the solvency of the parties, and not to
the genuineness of the instrument. There was clearly enough evi-
dence to show that the defendants meant to make themselves liable
as principals in this transaction.
The alleged misdirection raises tire question as to the extent of
responsibility which in such transactions the vendor of a bill takes
upon himself. This case seems to me to fall within the same prin-
ciple as the case of a biar of brass sold as a bar of gold, which was
put by Lord Campbell, C. J., in aompertz vs. Bartlett, (2 El. & BI.
847, 854; 18 Jur. 266, 267), and the other cases there cited.
When a person asks another, "1 Will you discount this bill ?" which
appears -on the face of it to be drawn, accepted, and endorsed
by certain persons, he represents it to be a bill drawn, accepted,
and endorsed by those persons; and if it is not, the considration
fail.
WIGHTMAN, J.-As -to the first point, it appears to me that
there was quite enough evidence to warrant the jury in coming to
the conclusion that the defendants acted as principals in the tran-
saction.
As to the alleged misdirection, it is said that the plaintiffs had
all that the defendants purported to sell, and that there was no gua-
ranty. But it seems to me that there was a guaranty that the bill
which the defendants professed to sell was a genuine instrument.
I cannot distinguish this case from the case of the sale of the
Guatemala bonds, (Young vs. Cole, 8 Bing. N. 0. 724,) and the
Navy bills, (5 Taunt. 488.) Much depends upon the terms and
the language used at the time of the transaction. In this case
the bill proves to be very different from the bill which the de-
fendants professed to sell; and therefore there was a failure of
consideration.
My brother Erie, who has gone to chambers, authorized me to
say that he is of the same opinion on both points.,
Lord CAMPBELL, C. J.-First, where a person employs a broker
to discount a bill, and the bill broker goes to a capitalist or money
dealer and procures him to discount it, the transaction is between
